South Lebanon remains Lebanon’s highest-risk zone. Monday saw two lethal Israeli strikes: a bus in Hanine and a car in Talloussah, killing at least two. Over the past week, nine airstrikes and two ground operations were conducted per the IDF’s own published summary. UNIFIL has documented 10,000+ ceasefire violations since November 2024. Israel maintains five occupied points in violation of the ceasefire agreement. Phase 2 disarmament nominally begins here — but Hezbollah’s categorical rejection and Shia ministerial walkout creates profound uncertainty. The Norwegian Refugee Council reported at least 50 Israeli raids in January alone — double the prior month.
Key FactorActive daily lethal strikes; Phase 2 disarmament launch amid Hezbollah rejection; 5 occupied Israeli points; IDF linked to Iran confrontation preparation.
The Beqaa has experienced alarming geographic expansion of Israeli operations. Sunday’s drone strike near Majdal Anjar — on the Damascus-Beirut highway ~40km from Israel — killed four and targeted PIJ operatives near the Syrian border. The IDF’s weekly summary confirms Beqaa operations are now a routine part of the strike cycle. The valley is strategically vital for Hezbollah supply lines from Iran via Syria, making it a long-term Israeli target priority. Agricultural communities face dual pressure: ongoing Israeli strike risk and Phase 2 disarmament tensions.
Key FactorMajdal Anjar PIJ strike marks dramatic geographic escalation — the Beqaa is now an active IDF operational zone alongside the south.
Nabatieh sits directly in the active IDF operations zone and at the precise overlap point between Phase 1 (complete) and Phase 2 (just launched) of the disarmament plan. The LAF faces operating in this historically Hezbollah-aligned area with an uncooperative Hezbollah following the cabinet walkout. Multiple strikes from the IDF’s weekly nine-airstrike total hit Nabatieh district. Reconstruction is stalled by ongoing operations and funding gaps. Displaced families face major obstacles to return.
Key FactorActive strike zone precisely overlapping the contested Phase 2 disarmament boundary creates Lebanon’s most complex ground-level security situation.
The capital faces its most acute internal political crisis since the Aoun-Salam government came to power. Phase 2 launch and the Hezbollah ministerial walkout represent a governing coalition rupture with no recent precedent. The May 10 election campaign adds political complexity. Speaker Berri’s single electoral district proposal threatens Christian party representation. Former PM Hariri’s reorganization of the Future Movement signals further realignment. Government buildings have enhanced security. No immediate kinetic threats in the capital, but political volatility is at a 2026 high.
Key FactorHezbollah cabinet walkout + Phase 2 launch = most acute domestic political crisis of 2026. No kinetic threat to capital, but governing stability under real stress.
Tripoli’s building collapse emergency remains ongoing. Two collapses within two weeks killed ~14 and displaced many families, with many remaining in structurally at-risk neighboring buildings rather than using temporary shelters. Civil defense assessments continue. The city’s infrastructure crisis compounds broader governance challenges. Election campaign season is beginning to intensify Tripoli’s historically volatile political environment, with the northern city a key battleground seat.
Key FactorBuilding collapse humanitarian emergency active with structural risk to neighboring properties; election politics intensifying in key northern battleground.
Baalbek-Hermel shares the Beqaa’s deteriorating security picture following the Majdal Anjar strike and the political fallout of the Phase 2 disarmament rejection. Hezbollah’s deep political and social roots in this region mean future disarmament expansion northward into this area will face maximum resistance. Humanitarian operations including Ramadan distributions continue serving vulnerable families. International organizations maintain presence.
Key FactorBeqaa spillover risk + Hezbollah’s strongest political base = highest anticipated friction for future disarmament phases.
The lowest-risk governorate in the current period, geographically distant from active strike zones. However, the broader political crisis filters through all Lebanese regions. Christian communities here are closely monitoring and opposing Speaker Berri’s single-district electoral law proposal. Tourism and business continue cautiously. The area is absorbing some displaced persons from the south.
Key FactorAway from kinetic threats but politically engaged — a key constituency in the May 10 election and electoral law debate.
Akkar’s Syrian border zone remains under LAF monitoring with relative stability. However, reports of former Assad regime figures allegedly residing in Lebanon — leaked by Al Jazeera in December — have created Syrian-Lebanese bilateral tension, with Damascus questioning Lebanese assurances. LAF border operations continue to address both internal and cross-border security requirements, stretching army capacity.
Key FactorSyrian bilateral complexity + LAF border resource demands add pressure alongside broader national security challenges.
▪South Lebanon
EXTREME CAUTION. Active daily lethal strikes (Monday: Hanine bus, Talloussah car). Avoid all unnecessary movement. Seek reinforced shelter. Follow LAF guidance.
▪Beqaa Valley
ELEVATED CAUTION. Majdal Anjar strike shows IDF operational reach into highway corridor. Avoid Damascus-Beirut road near Syrian border area.
▪Beirut
Monitor political situation following Hezbollah walkout. No kinetic threat to capital but political volatility elevated ahead of elections.
▪Tripoli
Avoid assessed structurally at-risk buildings in collapse zones. Follow civil defense guidance. Humanitarian support available for displaced families.
▪Southern Operations
Suspend or minimize in-person presence in active strike areas (Hanine, Talloussah, Nabatieh district, south Litani zone). Remote management protocols strongly recommended.
▪Beqaa Operations
Reassess operations near Majdal Anjar corridor and Damascus highway following Sunday PIJ strike. The Beqaa is now a documented active IDF zone.
▪Supply Chain / Logistics
Account for political instability from Hezbollah walkout and approaching elections. Contingency planning for potential post-election disruption.
▪Index 87/100
Critical level warrants review of business continuity plans and emergency protocols for all Lebanon-based operations.
▪South Lebanon
DO NOT TRAVEL. Active daily lethal strikes. Bus and car targeting confirmed Monday. No safe ground transit routes in active zones.
▪Beqaa Valley
EXTREME CAUTION. Majdal Anjar vicinity specifically dangerous. Avoid Damascus-Beirut highway corridor near Syrian border area.
▪Beirut
Exercise caution. Government/political meeting areas have heightened security. Normal urban movement with security awareness.
▪Beirut Airport
Operational. Australian and other Western governments have updated advisories to “reconsider travel” for Lebanon. Monitor for closure risk.
Tuesday, February 17, 2026 represents one of the most consequential days for Lebanese security and politics since the Aoun-Salam government came to power in early 2025. Three simultaneous crises have converged to push the overall index to 87/100 — the highest sustained reading of 2026.
82
Days to
May 10 Elections
~318
Days to UNIFIL
Mandate Expiry
~120
Phase 2 Disarmament
Window (minimum)
Core Contradiction
The Lebanese state has formally launched its most ambitious disarmament initiative since 2006 — while Hezbollah has categorically rejected it, walked out of cabinet, and Israeli strikes are escalating as Iran-preparation intensifies. These forces are pulling Lebanon in fundamentally incompatible directions simultaneously.
Phase 2’s announcement represents the Aoun-Salam government’s most direct confrontation yet with Hezbollah. The Lebanese state is now formally committed to disarming the Iran-backed group in the Litani-to-Awali zone — territory where Hezbollah maintains significant political and social infrastructure. The four-month minimum timeline is explicitly extendable based on LAF capabilities, Israeli attacks, and “field obstacles” — widely understood as a reference to Hezbollah resistance.
Hezbollah’s response has been swift and categorical. Secretary-General Qassem called the disarmament effort “a grave sin.” Lawmaker Fadlallah pledged the group would not be “lenient.” Most dramatically, Shia ministers physically walked out of the cabinet — an act with no recent precedent. This signals a potential governing coalition breakdown that, if it deepens, could paralyze cabinet decision-making in the critical pre-election period.
The IDF escalation layer adds dangerous instability. Israeli military analysts confirm strike escalation is partly preparation for a potential Iran confrontation. With 12 Hezbollah and PIJ operatives killed in Lebanon since February 1, and the unprecedented Majdal Anjar Beqaa strike killing four on Sunday, the operational tempo is at its highest sustained level since the November 2024 ceasefire. This escalation gives Hezbollah political justification — as Carnegie’s Michael Young has noted — to argue that disarmament exposes the community to Israeli aggression at the moment it is most vulnerable.
Lebanon now faces three overlapping countdowns: the May 10 election (82 days), the UNIFIL mandate expiration (December 31, 2026), and the Phase 2 disarmament window (120+ days). These timelines intersect in ways that amplify risk. A contested election could produce a stronger Hezbollah bloc, undermining the government’s disarmament mandate. UNIFIL’s departure removes the primary ceasefire monitoring mechanism. And each Israeli strike during Phase 2 makes the political case for Hezbollah’s continued armament stronger in the eyes of its constituency.
March Paris Conference — Critical Lifeline
An international conference in Paris in March in support of the Lebanese army represents a critical financial and political inflection point. Enhanced LAF equipment and funding could provide greater capacity to advance disarmament. The risk: better-equipped forces operating in contested Hezbollah areas could escalate friction. Donor willingness may also be conditioned on visible disarmament progress — creating a circular dependency.