CIS LEBANON SECURITY INDEX – June 28 2026

Sunday, June 28, 2026

⚠️ WAR DAY 121 — HEZBOLLAH ALLY: ENFORCING THE DEAL MEANS “CIVIL WAR” — LEBANESE ARMY ISSUES PUBLIC ORDER WARNING — REGIONAL IRAN-US CONFLICT REIGNITES WITH STRIKES ON KUWAIT, BAHRAIN — IRGC THREATENS “COMPLETE HALT” OF ALL DIPLOMACY OVER LEBANON CLAUSE — AOUN-TRUMP CALL SIGNALS CONTINUED US ENGAGEMENT

INDEX LEVEL: 🟡 MEDIUM — DOMESTIC POLITICAL RISK AND REGIONAL VOLATILITY BOTH RISING SIMULTANEOUSLY OVERALL NATIONAL INDEX: 62/100 TREND: ⬆️ RISING FROM 60 (JUNE 27) — TWO DISTINCT BUT INTERLOCKING RISK STREAMS INTENSIFIED OVERNIGHT: DOMESTICALLY, A HEZBOLLAH-ALIGNED LAWMAKER STATED EXPLICITLY THAT ENFORCING THE NEW ISRAEL-LEBANON FRAMEWORK WOULD REQUIRE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO “GO TO CIVIL WAR,” PROMPTING THE LEBANESE ARMY TO ISSUE A FORMAL PUBLIC ORDER WARNING. REGIONALLY, THE BROADER US-IRAN CONFLICT THAT MADE THE LEBANON DEAL POSSIBLE HAS REIGNITED SHARPLY OVERNIGHT — WITH FRESH US STRIKES ON IRAN, AN IRANIAN DRONE STRIKE ON A TANKER, AND AN IRGC RETALIATORY STRIKE ON US BASES IN KUWAIT AND BAHRAIN. IRAN’S MILITARY HAS EXPLICITLY WARNED THAT FURTHER VIOLATIONS — INCLUDING IN LEBANON — WILL “BRING ALL ONGOING DIPLOMATIC PROCESSES TO A COMPLETE HALT.”

🌐 SITUATION OVERVIEW — SUNDAY JUNE 28, 2026

TWO DAYS AFTER ISRAEL AND LEBANON SIGNED THEIR HISTORIC FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, THE TWO FORCES THAT COULD UNRAVEL IT — DOMESTIC LEBANESE POLITICS AND THE BROADER REGIONAL WAR — BOTH ESCALATED OVERNIGHT, ON SEPARATE BUT CONVERGING TRACKS.

Inside Lebanon, the rhetoric around the framework’s enforceability darkened considerably. Hassan Fadlallah, a senior Hezbollah-aligned lawmaker, told Iran’s Al Mayadeen network that Lebanese authorities would not be able to enforce the agreement signed with Israel “unless, with US support, they go to civil war.” He said Hezbollah would “confront any measure” taken by Lebanese authorities to implement the deal and would “hold on to its weapons even more,” describing the group’s opposition as “serious” and warning it would not allow authorities to implement their commitments on the ground. In direct response to the weekend’s street protests — burning tires blocking the airport road in Beirut’s southern suburbs — the Lebanese Army issued a formal public statement: “The army command will not allow any breach of security or threat to civil peace through actions with unpredictable consequences, road blockages, or attacks on public or private property.” This is the clearest signal yet that Lebanon’s own military now considers domestic unrest tied to the framework’s implementation a live operational concern, not just a political talking point.

At the same time, Israeli officials moved to reassure the public that the new framework represents real strategic gain. Speaking at a Saturday press conference, Netanyahu hailed the agreement as “a historic achievement for Israel” that advances toward an eventual full peace deal. A senior Israeli official added important operational nuance: future Israeli responses to Hezbollah attacks — including the question of whether to strike Beirut’s Dahiyeh district again — will now be “assessed on a case-by-case basis” rather than automatically, a meaningful, if quiet, shift from the policy in place for most of the war.

Diplomatically, the bilateral US-Lebanon-Israel track showed signs of continued momentum: President Aoun spoke by phone with President Trump, who had initiated the call to congratulate Aoun on the framework’s signing. Aoun used the opportunity to press Trump to lean on Israel to actually withdraw from occupied areas of southern Lebanon, while committing that Lebanon would “assume its responsibilities” in implementing the deal. Notably, the Lebanese presidency’s statement on the call made no mention of Hezbollah or disarmament — a sign of how delicately Beirut is trying to manage the domestic optics of the agreement. Trump indicated he would host Aoun in Washington soon.

But the day’s most consequential development may have happened far from Lebanon’s borders, in the Gulf. Overnight Saturday into Sunday, the fragile US-Iran ceasefire that underpins the entire regional diplomatic architecture — the same architecture Lebanon’s framework depends on — came under serious strain. After Iran struck a cargo vessel in the Strait of Hormuz on Thursday, the US carried out retaliatory strikes on Iranian targets Friday. Iran responded early Saturday morning by striking the oil tanker M/T Kiku with a one-way attack drone — what CENTCOM described as Iran having been “given a chance to honor the ceasefire agreement but elected not to.” The US struck Iran again in response. Then, at 2–3 a.m. local time on June 28 (today), Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps launched a retaliatory missile and drone operation against US-linked sites in Kuwait and Bahrain, claiming to have “destroyed eight important US military facilities” at the Ali al-Salem base in Kuwait and the US Fifth Fleet’s naval base in Bahrain — claims that could not be independently verified. The IRGC warned: “Any enemy aggression, whatever the pretext, even against insignificant targets… will have a crushing response.” Crucially for Lebanon, the IRGC also stated explicitly that “violating the ceasefire is contrary to Clause 1 of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and will result in the complete halt of all diplomatic processes” — and Clause 1 of that MOU is the same clause that names Lebanon.

President Trump, for his part, warned on Truth Social that the US “may no longer be able to be reasonable” and that if it is forced to “complete the job” militarily, “the Islamic Republic of Iran will no longer exist.”

CIS Security assesses today’s developments as a genuine inflection point in the regional risk picture. Lebanon’s domestic political track and the broader US-Iran military track — for weeks treated by analysts as semi-independent — are now both visibly destabilizing at the same moment, and Iran’s own military has explicitly tied the two together by invoking Lebanon’s place in the MOU as a justification for potentially abandoning diplomacy altogether.

📊 CIS SECURITY INDEX — JUNE 28, 2026

WHY 62/100: The index rises again, for the second consecutive day, driven not by new military escalation inside Lebanon itself but by two compounding political/regional risk factors: (1) explicit “civil war” framing from a senior Hezbollah-aligned lawmaker, serious enough to prompt a formal Lebanese Army public order statement — a genuinely new category of domestic instability risk; and (2) a sharp overnight re-escalation of the broader US-Iran conflict, with Iran’s own military explicitly linking any further escalation to a “complete halt” of the diplomatic process that includes Lebanon. WHY NOT HIGHER: No new mass-casualty strikes occurred inside Lebanon itself in this period beyond the previously reported Nabatieh al-Fawqa incident; Aoun-Trump engagement remains active and constructive; Netanyahu has signaled a less automatic approach to Dahiyeh retaliation; and the Lebanese Army is actively, visibly working to prevent unrest from spiraling.

🚨 ALL BREAKING DEVELOPMENTS — JUNE 27–28, 2026

🔴 #1 — HEZBOLLAH ALLY: ENFORCING THE DEAL MEANS “CIVIL WAR” — LEBANESE ARMY RESPONDS WITH PUBLIC ORDER WARNING

[Times of Israel, Al Mayadeen — confirmed June 27]

In the sharpest domestic political statement of the post-signing period, Hassan Fadlallah, a Hezbollah-aligned member of the Lebanese parliament, told Iran’s Al Mayadeen network that Lebanese authorities would not be able to enforce the framework agreement signed with Israel “unless, with US support, they go to civil war.”

Fadlallah said Hezbollah will confront any measure taken by Lebanese authorities to implement the deal on the ground, and that the group will “hold on to its weapons even more” in response — the opposite of the disarmament the framework requires as a precondition for Israeli withdrawal. He characterized Hezbollah’s opposition as “serious” and said it would not allow authorities to implement their commitments on the ground.

In direct response — and following Friday night’s protests in which Hezbollah supporters blocked the road to Beirut’s airport with burning tires — Lebanon’s army command issued a formal statement aimed at preventing further unrest: “The army command will not allow any breach of security or threat to civil peace through actions with unpredictable consequences, road blockages, or attacks on public or private property.”

This exchange — a senior Hezbollah ally invoking civil war, and Lebanon’s own military responding with an explicit law-and-order warning — represents the clearest evidence yet that the framework agreement’s domestic political risk is being taken seriously at the highest levels of the Lebanese state, independent of the military conflict with Israel.

🟢 #2 — NETANYAHU: FRAMEWORK A “HISTORIC ACHIEVEMENT”; DAHIYEH RESPONSE NOW “CASE-BY-CASE”

[Times of Israel — confirmed June 27]

At a Saturday press conference, Prime Minister Netanyahu characterized Friday’s signing in starkly positive terms, calling it “a historic achievement for Israel” that advances progress toward ending the bilateral conflict and opens the prospect of “an eventual peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon.” He separately reiterated his broader claim that Israel’s military campaigns — against Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iran directly — “created conditions” for the Iranian regime to eventually fall, asserting (without independent verification) that protests were taking place inside Iran “today.”

In a more operationally significant disclosure, a senior Israeli defense official told reporters that Israel’s prior policy of automatically striking Hezbollah’s Dahiyeh stronghold in Beirut in response to any Hezbollah attack on Israel is changing: “It will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. If Israeli communities come under attack, a decision will be made on how to respond. Dahiyeh may also become a target, but that is not an automatic response.” The official noted the strategic risk explicitly: a strike on Beirut could prompt an Iranian response and “devolve into a regional escalation.”

This marks a quiet but meaningful shift away from the doctrine articulated by Netanyahu earlier in June (“There will not be a situation in which Hezbollah attacks our cities and citizens while the terrorist headquarters in Dahiyeh remains out of bounds”), suggesting Israeli policymakers are now weighing escalation risk to the broader regional framework more heavily than in earlier phases of the war.

🕊️ #3 — AOUN-TRUMP CALL: LEBANON PRESSES FOR WITHDRAWAL, US ENGAGEMENT CONTINUES

[Times of Israel, Lebanese Presidency, RFE/RL — confirmed June 27]

President Trump initiated a phone call with President Joseph Aoun to congratulate him on the framework’s signing, according to the Lebanese presidency. Aoun used the call to convey that he hopes Washington will help prevent violations of the framework agreement and ensure agreed commitments are fulfilled — particularly by pressing Israel to withdraw from occupied areas in southern Lebanon. Aoun told Trump that Lebanon will assume its responsibilities in implementing the agreement.

Notably, the Lebanese presidency’s official statement on the call made no mention of Hezbollah or its disarmament — a deliberate omission that likely reflects Beirut’s effort to frame the agreement domestically as being about sovereignty and Israeli withdrawal, rather than about disarming a powerful domestic political-military actor, even though disarmament is the actual legal precondition written into the framework’s text.

Trump indicated he would soon host Aoun in Washington for an in-person meeting, though no date was announced. There was no immediate readout of the call from the White House.

🔴 #4 — REGIONAL ESCALATION: US-IRAN EXCHANGE FIRE AGAIN, IRGC STRIKES KUWAIT AND BAHRAIN

[RFE/RL, CBC News, CENTCOM — confirmed June 27–28]

The broader US-Iran conflict reignited sharply over the past 48 hours, in a sequence directly relevant to the Lebanon framework’s survival:

• Thursday, June 25: Iran’s IRGC struck a cargo vessel, the M/V Ever Lovely, in the Strait of Hormuz.
• Friday, June 26: The US carried out retaliatory strikes on Iranian targets. CENTCOM said this was in “direct response to continued Iranian aggression against commercial shipping.”
• Saturday, June 27, 4:30 a.m.: Iran launched a one-way attack drone that struck the oil tanker M/T Kiku (Panama-flagged) in the Strait of Hormuz. The UK’s UKMTO confirmed the tanker sustained bridge damage, with “all crew reported safe” and no environmental damage reported. CENTCOM characterized this as proof Iran “was given a chance to honor the ceasefire agreement but elected not to.”
• Saturday, June 27 (following the Kiku strike): The US struck Iran again.
• Sunday, June 28, 2–3 a.m. local time (today): Iran’s IRGC said its navy and aerospace forces launched joint missile and drone operations targeting US military sites in Kuwait and Bahrain, in retaliation for the US strikes. The IRGC claimed to have “destroyed eight important US military facilities at the Ali al-Salem base in Kuwait and at the Fifth Fleet naval base in Port Salman in Bahrain” — a claim that could not be independently verified. Kuwait and Bahrain both reported incoming projectiles; no US casualties have been reported.

Critical statement for Lebanon: The IRGC’s statement explicitly warned: “Violating the ceasefire is contrary to Clause 1 of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and will result in the complete halt of all diplomatic processes.” Clause 1 of that MOU — signed June 17 — is the same clause that names Lebanon explicitly, declaring “the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon.” Iran is therefore directly tying the fate of the broader nuclear/sanctions negotiation to continued military activity in Lebanon, raising the stakes of any future Israeli strike inside Lebanese territory considerably.

Trump’s response: On Truth Social, Trump warned: “There may come a point when we are no longer able to be reasonable, and will be forced to militarily complete the job that we very successfully started. If that happens, the Islamic Republic of Iran will no longer exist.” Vice President Vance separately noted on X that “Iran signed a ceasefire agreement,” implicitly accusing Tehran of violating its own commitments.

A senior Iranian official separately vowed a “swift and decisive” response to what Tehran characterizes as US violations of the MOU — a parallel, harder-edged statement to the IRGC’s military one, suggesting Iran’s political leadership is not moderating the military’s posture.

Bahrain’s government has separately accused Iran of “sabotaging peace efforts.”

🌊 #5 — STRAIT OF HORMUZ DISPUTE CONTINUES: NO AGREEMENT ON SAFE PASSAGE ROUTES

[CBS News — confirmed June 26–27]

Underlying this weekend’s military exchanges is an unresolved technical dispute over how vessels should transit the Strait of Hormuz following its reopening under the MOU. The UN’s International Maritime Organization has identified two available routes: one through Iranian waters in the north of the strait, and another skirting Oman’s coast to the south. The US has encouraged ships to use the Omani route, while Iran insists all vessels must seek its permission and use the route closer to its own coastline.

Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi stated bluntly on X Friday: “Safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, with ambiguous arrangements, parallel routes, or decision-making outside of Iran’s considerations as the coastal state, cannot be guaranteed.” A communications line between Iran and the US, established earlier in the week specifically to “avoid incidents and miscommunication” in the strait, evidently failed to prevent this weekend’s exchanges.

🟡 #6 — CONTINUED LOW-LEVEL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH LEBANON

[CBC News, Al Jazeera — confirmed June 27]

Despite the broader diplomatic developments, targeted Israeli strikes inside Lebanon continued over the weekend. Lebanese state television reported an Israeli drone strike Saturday in the Nabatieh area, with the Israeli military stating it had targeted a person who posed a threat to its forces — consistent with the pattern of targeted strikes against individuals approaching or inside the declared security zone that has characterized the post-framework period. Israeli military vehicles were observed navigating near destroyed buildings in southern Lebanon Saturday, illustrating the continued, visible Israeli ground presence even as the diplomatic framework moves forward on paper.

Lebanon’s overall war death toll, per Al Jazeera’s most recent reporting, stands at more than 4,000 people killed since fighting erupted on March 2 — a figure that, per CIS Security’s last precise count on June 25 (4,230 killed, 12,179 wounded), continues to rise incrementally with each new incident.

📅 KEY EVENTS TIMELINE — JUNE 27–28, 2026

🗺️ GOVERNORATE-BY-GOVERNORATE ASSESSMENT — JUNE 28, 2026

🏙️ 1. BEIRUT — 38/100 — 🟢 LOW (Rising)

Status: SUBSTANTIALLY SAFE MILITARILY, BUT DOMESTIC POLITICAL/CIVIL UNREST RISK NOW MATERIAL

No military strikes on Beirut proper. However, the combination of explicit “civil war” rhetoric from a senior Hezbollah-aligned lawmaker and a formal Lebanese Army public order warning represents a genuinely new risk category. Further protests, road blockages, or clashes in Dahiyeh and potentially other politically sensitive areas remain plausible in the coming days, particularly if the framework’s implementation proceeds against Hezbollah’s stated opposition.

Assessment: Central, east, and north Beirut — normal activity, monitor news closely for protest locations and Lebanese Army advisories. Dahiyeh — heightened caution; avoid demonstration areas; expect continued possible road blockages. Israeli strike risk on Dahiyeh specifically is now officially “case-by-case” per Israeli sources rather than automatic, somewhat reducing — but not eliminating — military risk to the area.

🏞️ 2. MOUNT LEBANON — 20/100 — ⚪ MINIMAL

Status: SAFE. No incidents.

🌊 3. NORTH LEBANON — 16/100 — ⚪ MINIMAL

Status: SAFE. No incidents.

🌲 4. AKKAR — 20/100 — ⚪ MINIMAL

Status: SAFE. No incidents.

🏛️ 5. KESERWAN-JBEIL — 16/100 — ⚪ MINIMAL

Status: SAFE. No incidents.

🍇 6. BEQAA VALLEY — 55/100 — 🟡 MEDIUM

Status: STABLE, ELEVATED. No new major incidents reported in this period.

🕌 7. BAALBEK-HERMEL — 60/100 — 🟡 MEDIUM

Status: ELEVATED RISK. No new major incidents reported in this period.

⛪ 8. NABATIEH — 80/100 — 🟠 HIGH

Status: HIGH RISK — CONTINUED TARGETED STRIKES

Saturday’s drone strike targeting “a person who posed a threat” continues the pattern of near-daily targeted Israeli operations in and around Nabatieh district, regardless of the broader framework’s signing.

Assessment: DO NOT ENTER Nabatieh district or surrounding front-line villages without CIS Security clearance. Treat any individual approaching declared or undeclared security-zone boundaries as being at direct risk of Israeli targeting.

🌴 9. SOUTH LEBANON — 78/100 — 🟠 HIGH

Status: HIGH RISK — OCCUPATION CONTINUES, VISIBLE IDF PRESENCE

Israeli military vehicles remain visibly active near destroyed buildings throughout the south. The broader security zone remains under Israeli control with no fixed withdrawal date beyond the two narrow pilot zones designated Friday.

Assessment: Continue to treat south Lebanon south of Sidon as HIGH DANGER. Contact CIS Security before any movement.

📊 ACTOR STATUS TABLE — JUNE 28, 2026

🛡️ CIS SECURITY — ASSESSMENT & GUIDANCE

CIS Security 24/7: +961-3-539900 | www.cissecurity.net | WhatsApp: wa.me/9613539900 Lebanese Red Cross: 1760 | Mine Action: 01-613920 | Civil Defence: 125

🟠 PRIORITY 1: NEW DOMESTIC POLITICAL RISK — MONITOR FOR FURTHER UNREST The combination of explicit “civil war” rhetoric and a formal Lebanese Army public order warning is unprecedented in this specific form during the current conflict. Avoid all demonstration areas, particularly in Beirut’s southern suburbs, and monitor Lebanese Army communications closely for further advisories in the coming days.

🔴 PRIORITY 2: REGIONAL ESCALATION — STRAIT OF HORMUZ/GULF CONFLICT COULD SPILL BACK INTO LEBANON Iran’s military has explicitly tied further escalation in the broader US-Iran conflict to a “complete halt” of all diplomatic processes — including the clause covering Lebanon. A serious rupture in the Gulf carries direct, material risk of renewed escalation inside Lebanon, regardless of the bilateral framework’s progress. CIS Security will issue updates immediately if this connection becomes concrete.

🟠 PRIORITY 3: NABATIEH AND SOUTH LEBANON — NO CHANGE TO HIGH-RISK STATUS Continued targeted strikes confirm that the security situation in and around Nabatieh and the broader south Lebanon security zone remains unchanged in practice, despite diplomatic progress on paper.

🕊️ PRIORITY 4: AOUN-TRUMP ENGAGEMENT — POSITIVE BUT EARLY Continued high-level US-Lebanon engagement, including a prospective Aoun visit to Washington, is a positive signal for the framework’s durability. This remains an early-stage diplomatic process, however, and should not be read as an indicator of imminent change to ground conditions.

✅ PRIORITY 5: MOST OF LEBANON REMAINS NORMAL Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon, Akkar, and Keserwan-Jbeil remain safe and unaffected, with normal commercial and residential life continuing.

⚠️ FINAL ASSESSMENT — JUNE 28, 2026

Two days after Israel and Lebanon signed a framework many hoped would mark a turning point, the forces most likely to determine whether that framework survives have both shown their hand. Inside Lebanon, a senior Hezbollah ally said the quiet part out loud: enforcing this deal, as written, would require the Lebanese state to go to war with its own largest armed political movement. The Lebanese Army’s response — a public, formal warning against unrest — confirms the country’s own institutions are treating that risk as real, not rhetorical.

And in the Gulf, the broader regional bargain that gave Lebanon’s framework any chance of holding together took its own hit. Strikes and counter-strikes between the US and Iran, an Iranian attack on a tanker, a retaliatory IRGC strike on two US allies’ territory, and — most importantly for Lebanon specifically — an explicit Iranian warning that any further escalation will “completely halt” the very diplomatic process that the Lebanon clause depends on.

Neither of these stories is, technically, about Lebanon’s south or about Hezbollah’s weapons directly. But both go to the heart of whether Friday’s signing ceremony in Washington produces an actual peace, or simply becomes the latest in a long line of agreements that exist on paper while the war continues, in slightly modified form, on the ground. CIS Security’s assessment is that this week — not the signing itself, but what follows it — will be the real test of whether Lebanon has actually turned a corner.

CIS Lebanon Security Index™ | Sunday, June 28, 2026 | WAR DAY 121

Sources: Times of Israel (June 27-28, 2026 — liveblog “PM: Deal tells Iran and Hezbollah they have ‘no role in Lebanon'” — Fadlallah “civil war” quote via Al Mayadeen, Lebanese Army public order statement, Netanyahu “historic achievement” quote, Israeli official “case-by-case” Dahiyeh statement, Aoun-Trump call details, Lebanese presidency statement; “Katz hails Lebanon deal as ‘strategic blow to Iranian axis'” — full army statement, Netanyahu press conference framing, senior Iranian official “swift and decisive” response quote); “Lebanon says Aoun spoke with Trump, asked US to press Israel on withdrawing from south” — full call details, Trump Washington meeting offer); RFE/RL (June 27-28 — “US Hits Iran Again As Trump Threatens To ‘Complete The Job’; IRGC Retaliates” — full timeline of M/V Ever Lovely, M/T Kiku, IRGC Kuwait/Bahrain strikes, “destroyed eight important US military facilities” quote, “crushing response” warning, Clause 1 Islamabad MOU quote, Aoun-Trump call confirmation, Nabatieh al-Fawqa “individual posing a threat” quote, Trump “Islamic Republic of Iran will no longer exist” quote, Vance “Iran signed a ceasefire agreement” quote); CBC News (June 27 — “Iran says it has launched retaliatory strikes on U.S. bases in Kuwait, Bahrain” — IRGC statement, Trump “no longer exist” quote, Nabatieh drone strike confirmation, Israeli military vehicles near destroyed buildings); CBS News live updates (June 26-27 — Strait of Hormuz communications line details, Iran deputy FM Gharibabadi quote on safe passage, France/Italy UNIFIL coalition confirmation via Aoun statement, Hezbollah Qassem “declaration of defeat” and disarmament refusal quotes); Al Jazeera (June 27 — “Hezbollah rejects Israel-Lebanon agreement as Israeli attacks hit south” — death toll “more than 4,000” confirmation, Lebanese Army statement on protests, Zeina Khodr analysis); Wikipedia “2026 Lebanon War” and “2026 Iran War” (June 28 — corroborating timeline details, casualty figures).

All Lebanese casualty figures from Lebanese Ministry of Public Health. IDF and CENTCOM statements from official spokespersons. IRGC statements from Iranian state media (Press TV) as reported by RFE/RL and CBC News. Hezbollah/Fadlallah statements from Al Mayadeen as reported by Times of Israel.

Index compiled: Sunday, June 28, 2026 — sources current as of midday Beirut time.

CIS Security 24/7: +961-3-539900 | www.cissecurity.net | WhatsApp: wa.me/9613539900